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ABSTRACT
Economic activities are closely related to real-world environmental issues. Currently, more atten-
tion is paid to the association between environmental regulations and industrial competitiveness
(IC) because of pressures on economic development and environmental protection. In this study,
we identify and explain the association between environmental regulations and IC in China. As
the largest developing country in the world, China has the unavoidable responsibility of protect-
ing the environment and promoting global economic development. We analyse the mechanisms
behind environmental regulations and industrial competiveness at the provincial level and
conclude that the impact of environmental regulations upon IC is not a simple linear one, but
a U-shaped relationship. It is argued that the crucial intervention to activate the U-shaped
relationship, or Porter’s Hypothesis, is innovation, which can be triggered by stringent regulations
and well-designed policies.
KEYWORDS
Environmental regulations;
industrial competitiveness;
Porter’s Hypothesis
JEL CLASSIFICATION
Q50; R11
I. Introduction
Economic activities are closely linked to real-world
environmental issues. Economic activities can improve
or damage environmental quality, which in turn may
facilitate or impede economic operations. Currently,
environmental protection and sustainable development
have permeated every aspect of human social and eco-
nomic activities.
Environmental problems are usually caused by
the negative externalities of economic activities,
which means that economic actors add external
costs to society through pollution without paying
the corresponding social costs. In the absence of
regulation, individuals tend to overexploit the envir-
onment at their own advantage. Therefore, environ-
mental problems cannot be solved by simple market
mechanisms: most countries implement environ-
mental regulations. Thus, strengthening environ-
mental protection and reinforcing environmental
regulations have become key issues, especially in
developed countries (Vogel 2009).
Developing countries, whose economic develop-
ment and technological levels are relatively low,
are facing a dilemma. On the one hand, due to
the significant role of industrialization in promot-
ing economic growth, these countries urgently
need to develop new industry. However, because
they are limited by their technological level, capital
strength and human capital, ‘pollution-intensive’
industries are their first choice, with the conse-
quence of huge costs to the environment. When
facing the choice between economic development
and environmental protection, the former gets
preference due to the ‘common view’ that firms
have already made an optimum choice in real
economic activity, where the implementation of
environmental regulations will increase the cost
of production, thus impeding competitiveness
and economic development (Denison 1979;
Gollop and Roberts 1983). Furthermore, develop-
ing countries assume that their ‘pollution-inten-
sive’ industries will be negatively affected by an
increase of stringent environmental regulations.
Besides this, environmental regulations in devel-
oped countries always tend to be more stringent
than those in developing countries, which leads
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public opinion to be sensitive to the potentially
negative effects of environmental policy on inter-
national trade and industrial competitiveness (IC).
In this light, academics and policymakers pay sig-
nificant attention to questions pertaining the
adoption of stringent environmental regulations
and whether this will hinder industrial and
national competitiveness (Wallace 1995).
China has achieved remarkable economic progress
during the past 30 years. Many factors have contrib-
uted to this success, particularly industrialization.
Even so, China is still experiencing a late-middle
period of industrialization (Cai 2009; Li 2009; Zhang
2012), in which China’s development has been exten-
sive, and where the nation has consumed a huge
amount of resources with low efficiency and high
pollution. The government’s unilateral pursuit of
rapid economic growth has subsequently led to dete-
rioration of the environment. According to the
OECD report, Environmental Performance Review
(2007), air pollution in Chinese cities is among the
worst in the world, and almost one-third of China’s
rivers are severely polluted. The Chinese Green
National Economy Accounting Study Report, issued
by SEPA and NBS, shows that the economic losses
caused by environmental pollution are 511.8 billion
yuan (approximately 62.5 billion dollars), which
accounted for 3.05% of the country’s GDP that year.
Thus, China’s environmental situation is quite severe.
Nonetheless, the Chinese government has taken
recognition of this dilemma and has begun to take
stringent actions. However, concerns about the nega-
tive effect of environmental regulations on economic
competitiveness and development have not disap-
peared, and such concerns remain influential to the
formulation and implementation of environmental
regulations, especially by local governments, which
often fail to achieve their goals to protect the environ-
ment (Li 2012).
The purpose of this study is to identify and
explain the relationship between environmental reg-
ulations and IC. First, we adopt indices to measure
both the degree of environmental regulation strin-
gency and IC. We then explore and identify the
effects of environmental regulations on IC in
China. The research is conducted at the provincial
level such that industries in the secondary sector are
treated as an aggregate, while taking into account
their spatial effects.
II. Literature review
Environmental regulations
In general, environmental problems derive from
market failure (Pigou 1920; Coase 1960). Because
of negative externalities, natural resources are over-
used and environmental problems increase. There is
a severe discontinuity between the optimal outputs
determined by the maximization of individual
profit and the maximization of social welfare, and
the costs of environmental pollution are mostly not
accounted for by polluters, which obliges other
stakeholders to share these costs. In other words,
the costs to polluters are much lower than those
impinged on society. Therefore, it is imperative that
governments take actions to correct market failure,
constrain environmental externalities and pursue
environmental equity by means of environmental
regulations (Stewart 1991).
Despite this urgent need, no clear, structured,
effective definition of environmental regulations
exists. However, some initial conceptualizations can
be found:
Regulations are general rules or specific actions
imposed by administrative agencies that interfere
directly with the market allocation mechanism or
indirectly by altering consumer and firm demand and
supply decisions. (Spulber 1989, p37)
In this context, our study aims to define environ-
mental regulations by reference to regulatory eco-
nomics: environmental regulations are the general
rules and specific actions enforced by administrative
agencies so as to control pollution and manage nat-
ural resources with the purpose of protecting the
environment and internalizing externalities, includ-
ing direct and indirect interventions.
In the 1990s, the conceptual boundaries of envir-
onmental regulations were extended. In addition to
the environmental regulations imposed by adminis-
trative agencies, voluntary regulations made by firms
and industrial associations were also included into
environmental regulations (Zhao, Zhu, and He
2009).
At present, environmental regulations maintain
three policy instruments, or a hybrid of these: (1)
instruments to conduct, (2) price instruments and
(3) quantity instruments (Wiener 1999). This
research groups these into two categories, i.e.
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command-and-control instruments and market-
based instruments. Command-and-control instru-
ments are conduct-oriented regulations. In this,
administrative agencies can mandate practices and
technologies to protect the environment (Wiener
1999). Usually, this concerns a series of standards
designed by regulators to be followed by polluters, or
to direct a certain industry to adopt particular tech-
nologies in accordance to defined rules and regula-
tions. Administrative agencies can impose sanctions
on violators and reward compliers. For example, in
the case of pollutant discharge in China’s coking
chemical industry,1 new ways of discharging have
been clearly set by administrative agencies, which
require that firms adopt certain technologies so as
to control the emission of SO2.
2 Moreover, these
agencies have even set output ceilings so as to con-
trol the negative externalities generated by produ-
cers, like in the Chinese paper-making industry,
whose output ceiling was 116 million tons in 2015.3
Command-and-control instruments can also be
simple and direct. Standards and rules set by admin-
istrative agencies usually reflect the willingness of
society to control and reduce pollution. It is the
most widely adopted approach today (Wiener
1999). However, due to the different levels of eco-
nomic development and technology, the stringency
of these environmental regulations differs. Generally,
developed countries adopt stringent regulations,
while developing countries often implement lax reg-
ulations (Copeland and Taylor 1994).
However, in light of the existence of previous
government failure, the formulation and implemen-
tation of these environmental standards may not
achieve the optimal result in reality, by for instance
increasing the government’s financial burden or the
costs to society in general (Zhao, Zhu, and He 2009;
Wang 2012; Li 2013).
On the other hand, market-based instruments use
market signals to control pollution and internalize
externalities, mainly including price and quantitative
instruments. In terms of price instruments, Emission
Tax/Pigouvian tax is representative measure. For
quantity instruments, emission permit trading is a
widely used measure. In addition, this also includes
subsidy systems, deposit refund systems and voluntary
environmental agreements (Stavins 2000; Segerson
and Miceli 1998). Price instruments always direct pol-
luters to pay for the social costs of their activities and
hereby internalize environmental costs. These instru-
ments can be imposed ex post or ex ante. Ex post
instruments are based on the strict liability of sources
of pollution that have damaged the environment. With
respect to ex ante instruments, administrative agencies
impose tax on polluters for the estimated external costs
of their emissions beforehand (Wiener 1999). Quantity
instruments first set upper limits on the amount of
resource usage and pollution discharge.
Administrative agencies then partition this quantity
to different parties by granting licences or permits.
These licences and permits can be traded in the mar-
ket, through negotiation between different partici-
pants. Compared to price instruments, quantity
instruments use trading between polluters to interna-
lize externalities and implement regulations, which
eases the financial burden upon the government and
reduces the total social cost. However, its defects are
also obvious. With the total amount of pollutants
unchanged, these tend to concentrate in particular
areas. Moreover, the premise of emission permit trad-
ing is sometimes hard to achieve completely, especially
in terms of zero-transaction cost. Even so, it is still an
innovation in governmental policy and indeed has
positive effects on environmental protection (Wiener
1999; Zheng 2005).
III. Industrial competitiveness
Competition is fundamental to the market economy
and especially the efficient allocation of resources. In
this context, academics and organizations strongly
debate national competitiveness – where in fact, IC,
national competitiveness and enterprise competitive-
ness are strongly linked. Similarly, the improvement
of IC is based on the improvement of enterprise
competitiveness within the industry, which conse-
quently improves national competitiveness (Porter
1990).
1Referring to the Chinese national standard, Emission standard of pollutants for coking chemical industry (GB16171-2012) issued by MEP and GAQSIQ of China.
2In 2002, MEP and MT of China promulgated a policy, named Pollution Control Technology Policy of Sulphur Dioxide Emissions in Coal Industry, which
mandated certain technologies to control Sulphur Dioxide Emissions.
3Referring to China’s twelfth five-year plan for paper-making industry issued by NDRC in 2011. It is a supporting plan of the Twelfth Five-year Plan of National
Economy and Social Development.
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As for the definition of IC, no consensus exists. In
1985, World Economic Forum (WEF) first put for-
ward the concept of international competitiveness:
the ability that firms in one country provide pro-
ducts and services that are of a better quality and
have lower costs than those of foreign competitors.
In 1991, IMD and WEF jointly defined international
competitiveness as follows: the ability that firms in
one country design, produce and sell products and
services at a global scale, with more attractive price
and non-price characteristics than those of its com-
petitors (IMD. 1991). In 1994, WEF and IMD rede-
fined international competitiveness as the ability of a
nation or firm to produce more sustainable wealth
than global competitors (IMD. 1994).
Michael Porter (1990), one of the first academics
to engage with IC, argued that simply defining com-
petitiveness at the national level is not appropriate.
Instead, he stressed that the focus should be on
specific industries and industrial segments – through
which national competitiveness can be explained. He
defined IC as follows: the superior productivity,
either in terms of lower costs than competitors, or
the ability to offer superior products, justified by a
premium price (Porter and Van De Linde 1995). The
famous Chinese economist Jin (1996) used a similar
definition i.e. that IC is the productivity reflected by
sales performance within international markets.
In this study, IC is similarly defined as (1) super-
ior productivity to occupy markets and gain profits,
and (2) the capacity reflected in international mar-
kets to achieve a product’s value, meet the consu-
mers’ demands and realize sustainable development.
IV. The association between environmental
regulations and IC
Currently, there are three key theoretical perspectives
regarding the effect of environmental regulations
upon IC. First, regulations are regarded as being help-
ful to competitiveness, while second, they are per-
ceived to have a negative effect, due to increased
costs. Third, it is said to insignificantly impact IC.
V. Traditional hypotheses
Traditional hypotheses maintain that the implemen-
tation of environmental regulations will negatively
affect IC because of increasing costs, decreasing
profits and losses in productivity. Two common
suppositions are the ‘race-to-the-bottom hypothesis’
and the ‘pollution haven hypothesis’.
The race-to-the-bottom hypothesis emerged in
the United States between the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. It stresses that environ-
mental regulations will increase costs in certain
industries and that each country anticipates that
other countries will adopt less stringent environ-
mental standards so as to avoid cost increases that
result from relatively high environmental stan-
dards. Hence, all countries will ultimately race to
lower their standards so as to make themselves
more attractive to outside financial investment
(Schram 2000), which in turn leads to globally
relaxed regulations and ultimately to the deteriora-
tion of the global environment. This hypothesis
illustrates a contradiction between individual and
collective rationality. Although the hypothesis is
derived from the case of the United States, it
tends to contradict reality today, because global
environmental regulations have proven to be
more stringent than expected, where even the
recent financial crisis has not altered this trend.
The pollution haven hypothesis may be one of the
most controversial premises in international eco-
nomics. It can be explained by the H–O theory, in
which environmental factors are regarded as inputs
of production – in which countries that have abun-
dant environmental factors hold a comparative
advantage. In this light, the cost of environmental
factors is determined by the stringency of environ-
mental regulations (SER). Therefore, countries with
less stringent regulations are said to have compara-
tive environmental advantages. Next, as a conse-
quence of trade, pollution-intensive industries
relocate to these countries, which are almost always
in the developing world. Thus, pollution havens are
unintentionally formed due to the agglomeration of
these pollution-intensive firms and industries
(Siebert 1977; McGuire 1982). Furthermore, many
policymakers and academics argue that stringent
environmental regulations will hollow out industry,
leading to a decline in exports and an increase in
imports. A reduction in the competitiveness of these
industries is therefore inevitable (Jaffe et al. 1995).
Scholars have conducted several empirical studies
to test this hypothesis. Gray and Shadbegian (1995)
use data on the paper, oil and steel industries (1979–
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1990) to test this and found that abatement costs
have a significant, negative relationship with total
factor productivity. Specifically, $1 spent in abate-
ment will cost the equivalent of $1.74 in productivity
loss in the paper industry, $1.35 in the oil industry
and $3.28 in the steel industry. However, other
environmental regulation measures, e.g. control of
emissions and enforcement and compliance, do not
show an obvious association with total factor pro-
ductivity. Picazo-Tadeo, Reig-Martinez and
Hernandez-Sancho (2005) used the directional dis-
tance function to test the influence of environmental
regulations on the Spanish ceramic pavement indus-
try. Their results show that firms with the potential
to improve their desired output will be significantly
affected by environmental regulations that prevent
waste disposal. They found that if the disposal of
industrial water is free, then the amount of products
will increase by 7%. Conversely, when the disposal of
waste water is charged, the potential increase in
goods will decrease to 2.2%. This illustrates that
environmental regulations are causal to decreased
growth.
VI. Revisionist hypotheses
Unlike the previous hypotheses, revisionist hypoth-
eses argue that environmental regulations generate
win–win situations, where the environment
improves and IC is enhanced at the same time. The
Porter Hypothesis, coupled with the Pollution Halo
Hypothesis and the race-to-the-top Hypothesis,
represents such a view.
The Porter Hypothesis was developed in the arti-
cle, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
competitiveness Association, by Porter & Van der
Linder (1995), and suggested that innovation can
be triggered by properly designed environmental
standards through which the competitiveness of a
particular industry is enhanced over time. Benefits
can be derived from (1) innovation offset; and (2)
the early mover advantage. Innovation is said to
offset the costs of obeying regulations, and where
more stringent regulations can also generate greater
innovation. In addition, firms can gain early mover
competitive advantages within the international
market, once domestic environmental standards are
consistent with international ones (Porter and Van
De Linde 1995). Thus, the Porter Hypothesis
provides a win–win situation between environmen-
tal regulations and IC, instead of a trade-off.
Zarsky (1999) proposed the Pollution Halo
Hypothesis, which asserts that FDI can aid the diffu-
sion of cleaner technologies, better environmental
management systems and best practices throughout
the world, because MNCs maintain the same envir-
onmental standards and procedures across countries.
Thus, FDI can promote the transfer of superior
technologies from developed to developing econo-
mies. Although this hypothesis concerns the impact
of FDI on the environment, FDI is closely related to
competitiveness (Dunning 1992). The hypothesis
indicates that with an increase in competitiveness,
the SER will also increase such that they have a
positive association.
The race-to-the-top hypothesis is based on the
famous ‘California effect’ proposed by Vogel
(1997). It maintains that stringent environmental
regulations can push regulatory standards upwards.
From the 1970s to the 1990s, California enacted
stricter automobile emission standards than other
states. Instead of states with lax regulations under-
mining the California’s automobile industry, this
helped to push the whole country’s auto emission
standard upwards. The effect even spilled over to
Europe, as manufacturers had to comply to stricter
regulations so as to ensure market access and avoid
the huge expenditures of complying to different
standards. Furthermore, Vogel concluded that mar-
ket competition caused by trade liberalization facil-
itates the spillover of environmental standards from
greener to less green nations (Vogel, 1997). Because
the degree of liberalization and trade openness is a
vital factor in improving competitiveness and can be
reflected by FDI, one can also conclude that envir-
onmental regulations have a positive association
with competitiveness.
Some studies adopt an econometric model to
overcome the limitations of Porter’s Hypothesis,
which lacks quantitative analysis. Hamamoto
(2006) applied an econometric model to Japanese
manufacturing industries and found evidence to
support Porter’s Hypothesis. The author used pollu-
tion control expenditures to measure environmental
regulations and showed that environmental regula-
tions have a positive effect on R&D activity. Further,
R&D investment has a significant, positive influence
on total factor productivity and stimulates a high
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rate of return. Boyd, Tolley and Pang (2002) used
the Malmquist–Leunberger Index, which provides a
link between the rate of diffusion of technology and
productivity growth and the directional distance
function, to test the association between environ-
mental regulations (measured by emissions of
NOx). This is tested on the productivity of the glass
container industry with data ranging from 1987 to
1990. The results show that the potential output of a
win–win situation exceeds the output loss caused by
environmental regulations in all years except 1988,
as well as the change in technology contributed to
productivity growth and environmental protection.
These conclusions support Porter’s Hypothesis.
Bommer (1999) supports the revisionist hypothesis
from an alternative perspective. The author builds a
political-support maximum model based on the
assumption that the information between the regula-
tor and the regulated is asymmetric. The results show
that an entrepreneur may rearrange capital and relo-
cate production for purely strategic reasons instead of
reduced competitiveness. Relocation is a way of indir-
ect rent seeking to convince a regulator of the enter-
prises’ inability to accept further tightening of
environmental regulations (Bommer 1999). Thus,
Bommer’s research denies the traditional hypothesis.
Dong, Gong and Zhao (2012) study the association
between FDI and environmental standards and
applies a north–south market model based on the
assumption that pollution is trans-boundary. The
authors find that if the market sizes of two countries
are small, FDI can trigger a ‘race-to-the-top’ in emis-
sion standards, but if the market sizes are sufficiently
large, FDI will not change the environmental stan-
dards. The authors deny the traditional hypothesis to
some extent, although they do not demonstrate a
‘race-to-the-top’ under the circumstances of a large-
size market.
VII. Comprehensive ‘theory’
Debates between promoters of the traditional and
revisionist hypotheses are vigorous, which impels
some researchers to reexamine the association
between the two. Some think that environmental
regulations alone cannot influence IC but have a
combined effect with other factors. Others do not
regard environmental regulations as having a deci-
sive impact on competitiveness. Although there has
been no well-formulated theory to this point, many
academics have built economic models or conducted
empirical research to support their views.
For example, Sinclair-Desgagné (1999) summar-
ized innovation into three types: (1) incremental,
(2) risk reducing and (3) radical. The author argues
that the Porter Hypothesis is partially acceptable.
Generating a win–win situation depends on the
type of innovation firms pursue – incremental,
risk reducing or radical – and on the measures
taken by regulators to facilitate the innovation.
Another study by Sartzetakis and Constantatos
(1995) notes that the effect of environmental reg-
ulations is related to the instruments the govern-
ment chooses. For example, in a Cournot–Nash
equilibrium, regulations implemented through
emission permit trading can contribute to the effi-
cient allocation of an abatement effect and an
increase in the total market share of firms, which
command and control instruments may fail to
achieve (Sartzetakis and Constantatos 1995).
The research conducted by Xepapadeas and De
Zeeuw (1999) is also important. The authors develop
a mathematical model in which firms invest in
machines at different ages, whereby the newer
machines have high productivity and are cleaner
but are also more expensive compared to the older
machines. They find that more stringent environ-
mental regulations have two effects: (1) a productiv-
ity effect and (2) a profit-emission effect. The former
refers to a situation in which the downsizing of
capital stock and the modernization of machines
arising from strict regulations leads to an average
increase in productivity. However, the profit-emis-
sion effect implies that profits and emissions will
decline at the same time. Although the decreasing
speed of profits will be lowered by the moderniza-
tion of machines, a profit decline is inevitable. The
authors do not evaluate the effect of environmental
regulations on IC directly but focus on productivity
and profit, which are two important aspects of com-
petitiveness. However, their performance related to
environmental regulations differs.
Jaffe et al. (1995) conclude that sometimes the
effect of environmental regulations on IC may be
so small that it is hard to detect. They find that with
existing data, there is a limited ability to measure the
degree of stringency that compliance costs are a
small proportion of the total costs of production,
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that there are gaps between the environmental
requirements in some nations and that firms are
unwilling to relocate to technologically inferior
nations or to developing countries with greater-
than-expected pollution controls. Based on a review
of empirical studies, the authors conclude further
that little consistent empirical evidence can be
found to support either the traditional hypothesis
or the revisionist hypothesis. Therefore, Jaffe et al.
(1995) consider that the truth lies somewhere
between the two extreme situations.
VIII. Materials and methods
The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of
environmental regulations on IC. Specifically, this
study aims to investigate the influence of different
stringent environmental regulations on IC and their
underlying mechanisms, in the context of China.
Therefore, IC forms our dependent variable, while
the SER serves as the independent variable. The
research is conducted at the provincial level. Due
to data unavailability, different industries in the sec-
ondary sector were aggregated. Panel data for sec-
ondary sectors in each province were collected.
Superior productivity was used to define IC, based
on the definition proposed by Porter (1990), mean-
ing that high productivity leads to high competitive-
ness. In microeconomics, the traditional production
function is determined by labour, capital, land and
entrepreneurship. Later, Cobb and Douglas
improved the production function by adding the
technology factor (Cobb and Douglas 1928).
Therefore, this research also measured superior pro-
ductivity using the above aspects. Considering the
unavailability of data and drawing on previous
experience in related research, we did not include
land data, and we used the innovation factor to
represent entrepreneurship and technology factors.
Thus, the productivity function is as follows:
Productivity ¼ f Labour; Capital; Innovationð Þ
(1)
Additionally, according to the competitiveness the-
ory proposed by WEF and IMD,4 these factors of
production, namely labour, capital and innovation,
only reflect competitive assets. The ability to inte-
grate these factors is also important, which to some
extent indicates the competitive process and
entrepreneurship.
Thus, the evaluation of IC was conducted based
on four aspects: labour, capital, innovation and inte-
grative ability. Hence, the formula for the IC func-
tion is as follows:
Industrial Competitiveness
¼ g Labour; Capital; Innovation; Abilityð Þ (2)
This formula measures IC from the perspective of
production. It refers to the built-in mechanism that
can improve productivity and further improve com-
petitiveness (Schumpeter 1934; Corden 1994;
Preibisch 2007; Wang 2012).
In terms of defining our independent variable
SER, existing instruments include command-and-
control, price and quantity instruments. The
Chinese government mixes instruments and the pro-
portion of different instruments changes over time
(Jiang 2010). Hence, measuring SER based on the
instruments themselves is difficult.
Following Claire and Levinson (2016), we provide
the following four challenges, quoting:
(1) multidimensionality – environmental regula-
tions cannot easily be captured by a single
measure of ‘stringency’;
(2) simultaneity – regulations are meant to affect
emission levels, but emissions levels can also
be a factor in determining the stringency of a
regulation, because, for example, jurisdictions
with the most serious pollution problems may
impose the strongest regulations;
(3) industrial composition – in places where the
mix of industries is more pollution intensive,
the average business automatically faces more
stringent regulations and
(4) capital vintage – regulatory standards are
typically stricter for new sources of pollution,
which may result in firms keeping older
plants in operation longer, thus affecting the
environment, the economy and measures of
regulatory stringency.
4Quote from a secondary source: Wang, Y., 2000. The International Competitiveness of the Chinese Economy. Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, Nanchang,
pp 43.
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Therefore, this research uses environmental regula-
tory instruments to define and measure stringency.
Many academics have adopted a similar method (De
Vries and Withagen 2005; David Popp 2006;
Greenstone, List, and Syverson 2012). For example,
Olsthoorn et al. (2001) use SO2, NOX and COD
emissions to operationalize environmental perfor-
mance. The diversity of industries in our study
represents different types of pollution, e.g. waste
water, SO2 (representing waste gas) and solid waste
were used to measure the achievement and effective-
ness of environmental regulations. Notably, SO2 data
have been used to represent waste gas because SO2 is
the typical coal-smoke pollution that is consistent
with the current Chinese energy structure.
Operationalization of other control variables: The
association between the environment and competi-
tiveness has been researched for quite some time,
but no conclusive results have been obtained. One
reason is that prior research has not accounted for
important moderating factors or control variables
(Wagner, 2001). To study the association between
SER and IC, other exogenous variables that may
influence the association must therefore be con-
trolled for. Wagner (2002) proposes that the scale
of firms, the different characteristics of countries, the
different operating processes used and varying
industrial market structures can all have a significant
influence on the model. In addition to such factors,
Li (2013) argued that pollution intensity is also
important and may influence the association.
Considering the scope and aim of this research
and the availability of data, the scale of industry,
pollution intensity and number of firms within
industries were added to the model, with certain
location characteristic factors. Specifically, the scale
of an industry could determine the ability of the
industry to comply with environmental regulations
and control pollution. The pollution intensity of an
industry may reveal the difference in the processes
and techniques of production and the difficulties
faced in controlling pollution. The number of firms
within the industry reflects the industry’s market
structure to some extent such that an industry with
more firms tends to have a lower degree of mono-
poly and vice versa.
Location variables can depict the basic character-
istics of each province, which can influence the
association between SER and IC (Wagner, 2001).
These variables include population, which indicates
the size of the local labour market, GDP per capita,
which reflects the level of economic development,
infrastructure level, education level and FDI, which
reflects the openness of the economy. These vari-
ables are adopted in many empirical studies on
regional competitiveness, including the Global
Competitiveness Report issued by the WEF and the
Hungary competitiveness report by Lengyel (2004).
Data sources included statistical yearbooks related
to environment, science, technology and the indus-
trial economy, the yearbook of China concerning
each province, and the China Economy
Information Net Statistics Database, which were
issued by national and provincial governments. The
data range from 2001 to 2010 for 30 provinces; data
were unavailable for Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Macao.
Before proceeding with the analysis and model-
ling, data and variables were processed. Due to the
nature of the data, variables related to price and
output i.e. SI, GDP_PC and FDI were divided by
inflation rate, and the price data were weighted by
the price level of the base year, 2000. Additionally,
because FDI were originally reported in US dollars,
it was converted into Chinese Yuan according to the
average exchange rate in that year, so as to maintain
data consistency. SER, PI, IC and INF were compo-
site variables that needed to be calculated. To sim-
plify the calculation, all sub-variables were given the
same weight. Within each sub-variable, the indica-
tors also had the same weight. Before summing up
the different indicators of SER, IC and PI, the indi-
cators were standardized from 0 to 1 to eliminate the
effect of index dimension. The min–max method
was applied as the following formula 3 shows:
Ikt ¼ Vkt min Vkð Þmax Vkð Þ min Vkð Þ (3)
where Ikt is the normalized value of indicator k in
time t. Vkt is the original value of indicator k in time
t. min Vkð Þ and max Vkð Þ are the respective mini-
mum and maximum values of indicator k during the
studied period.
After that, all the indicators were aggregated into
SER, PI, IC and INF indexes, respectively.
Descriptive statistics of all variables included in the
model and their correlations can been found in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
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In the environmental discipline, a famous curve
exists namely the Environmental Kuznets Curve,
which describes the U-relationship between eco-
nomic development level and environmental quality.
It demonstrates that environmental degradation
worsens as economy develops until the average
income reaches a certain threshold (Shafik 1994).
To some extent, this theory can also be used in the
analysis on environmental regulation and IC. IC
would expectedly worsen as environmental regula-
tions are strengthened, until the SER reaches a turn-
ing point. In case of the non-linear association
between IC and SER like the Environmental
Kuznets Curve, the square term of SER was included
in the model, and the cubic term of SER was also
tried out during modelling.
To reflect the spatial association between neigh-
bouring provinces, a spatial regression model was
applied. Panel data for the whole secondary industry
of different provinces were modelled using either the
spatial autoregression model (SAR), the spatial error
model (SEM) or the spatial Durbin model (SDM).
Before modelling, the spatial weight matrix was set
according to geographic situation, and Moran’s I
index was also calculated to test the existence and
properties of spatial association.
Two basic models in spatial econometrics are the
SAR model and the SEM. In 2009, LeSage and Pace
proposed a more general model, the SDM, which
nests both spatial lagged dependent variables and
independent variables, and is more general. When
θ ¼ 0, it is the SAR; when θþ ρβ ¼ 0, it is the SEM
model.
The following formulas are potential models:
IC ¼ αþ αi þ ρWICþ Xβþ ε
ε,NID 0; σ2I
  (4)
IC ¼ αþ αi þ Xβþ ε; ε ¼ λWεþ μ
μ,NID 0; σ2I
  (5)
IC ¼ αþ αi þ ρWICþ XβþWXθþ ε
ε,NID 0; σ2I
  (6)
where X is the vector of control variables, ρ and λ are
the autoregression coefficient, W is the spatial
weight matrix, ε is the error term, α is the common
intercept and αi is individual effect. The selection of
the model was based on a series of statistical tests,
including Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests and its
robustness tests, Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests and
Wald tests. (See appendix for detailed results)
IX. Results
Elhorst (2010) proposed a series of test procedures
to determine which model is the most appropriate to
explain the data. First, we applied OLS, the LM test
and the robust LM test to test whether the SAR or
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Mean SD(overall) SD (between) SD (within) Min Max
IC 0.320 0.094 0.068 0.066 0.064 0.596
SER 0.662 0.181 0.139 0.119 0.127 0.953
PI 0.197 0.156 0.132 0.087 0.002 0.735
SI 9427.588 13,389.470 11,133.650 7684.463 194.160 82,918.450
MS 10,158.040 12,958.940 11,827.260 5679.849 388.000 65,495.000
GDP_PC 1.666 1.348 1.182 0.680 0.298 7.248
POP 4313.570 2611.130 2647.251 144.936 523.100 10,440.960
FDI 226.339 304.922 287.505 113.167 1.256 1568.854
INF 0.206 0.167 0.161 0.053 0.003 0.892
EDU 7.185 4.979 4.696 1.845 1.828 31.499
Table 2. Correlation table.
SER SER2 PI d(SI) MS d(GDP_PC) d(POP) d(FDI) INF EDU
SER 1.00
SER2 – 1.00
PI −0.58 −0.58 1.00
d(SI) 0.40 0.41 −0.52 1.00
MS 0.41 0.42 −0.50 0.88 1.00
d(GDP_PC) 0.47 0.49 −0.62 0.47 0.43 1.00
d(POP) 0.14 0.15 −0.28 0.46 0.44 0.28 1.00
d(FDI) 0.19 0.18 −0.21 0.26 0.19 0.21 0.07 1.00
INF 0.51 0.52 −0.51 0.29 0.27 0.69 0.26 0.14 1.00
EDU 0.26 0.29 −0.45 0.09 0.07 0.68 0.23 0.10 0.79 1.00
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SEM model is more appropriate to describe the data.
Conducting the OLS and spatial lag models allowed
us to assess whether the SDM statistically outper-
forms the other models, particularly the spatial lag
model. In the case that the OLS model is rejected,
then the SDM model would be estimated by max-
imum likelihood. Subsequently, the LR test could be
used to test the hypotheses H0 : θ ¼ 0 and
H0 : θþ ρβ ¼ 0. In the case that the hypotheses are
rejected at the same time, the SDM model would be
most appropriate. However, if H0 : θ ¼ 0 cannot be
rejected and the (robust) LM test is also in favour of
SAR, the SAR model can best describe the data. If
H0 : θþ ρβ ¼ 0 cannot be rejected and the (robust)
LM test also points to the SEM model, then the SER
model describes the data best. If one of these condi-
tions is not satisfied, i.e. the (robust) LM test and the
LR test point to different models, then the SDM
model is still best because it generalizes the SAR
and SEM models. The (robust) LM tests mentioned
above were developed by Anselin (1988). These tests
are based on the results of the OLS estimation. Two
types of LM tests were applied, one-directional test
and one robustness test.
First, a pooled regression model is estimated
without considering spatial effects. Based on these
estimations, the LM tests were conducted to per-
form the first-round selection. The results of the
LM tests are listed below. Due to lack of space, the
estimation results of the pooled regression model
are not listed.
Table 3 shows that spatial effects exist, and there-
fore, the OLS estimation is rejected. Because China’s
industrial economy has not experienced a structural
transformation since 2001 (Cai 2009; Li 2009; Zhang
2012), the spatial model also only considers the
individual effect model and neglects the time effect.
The Hausman test that is shown in Table 4 rejects
the random effect. Therefore, the following estima-
tions only consider the individual fixed effects. The
estimation includes the squared term of SER. The
estimation results for SDM are as follows:
The two LR tests reject the null hypotheses.
Therefore, the SDM model is an appropriate model
according to the rules of Elhorst.
However, the coefficients above do not explain
the spillover effect and marginal effect of the vari-
ables as in an ordinary model because the point
estimates of spatial regression models do not con-
sider complex interactions correctly and lead to
erroneous conclusions (LeSage and Pace 2009).
LeSage and Pace (2009) therefore propose a partial
derivate method to interpret the impact of changes
to the variables. They divide the impact into three
effects, namely the direct effect, indirect effect and
total effect. The direct effect shows the effect from
the change in an explanatory variable in a local unit,
the indirect effect measures the impact on other
dependent variables in other units and the total
effect is the sum of the direct effect and the indirect
effect. The three effects are listed below.
IC and SER are in U-shaped relationship, which
means that the traditional hypothesis explains the
first part, while Porter’s Hypothesis explains the
second part. Additionally, IC is not only influenced
by SER in the local unit but is also influenced by SER
in neighbouring units and even in non-neighbouring
units.
The turning point can be calculated according to
Table 5. For the direct effect, the turning point is
approximately 0.74, which means that SER has a
Table 3. Results of tests for spatial dependence.
Statistics Value Prob.
LM error 77.931 0.000*
LM lag 24.324 0.000*
Robust LM error 55.176 0.000*
Robust LM lag 1.569 0.210
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4. Estimation results for SDM.
Variable Coefficient (SE) Variable Coefficient (SE)
SER −0.2147**
(0.0972)
W × SER −0.3950**
(0.1736)
SER2 0.1447*
(0.0774)
W × SER2 0.2409*
(0.1382)
PI −0.1418***
(0.0428)
W × PI −0.2007**
(0.0763)
d(SI) 5.05 × 10−6*
(2.37 × 10−6)
W × d(SI) 3.76 × 10−6
(2.84 × 10−6)
MS −9.34 × 10−8
(5.38 × 10−7)
W × MS −6.29 × 10−7
(6.66 × 10−7)
d(GDP_PC) 0.0926**
(0.0289)
W × d(GDP_PC) −0.0180
(0.0448)
d(POP) 4.49 × 10−5
(3.61 × 10−5)
W × d(POP) −1.127 × 10−4
(6.58 × 10−5)
d(FDI) 1.76 × 10−5
(3.37 × 10−5)
W × d(FDI) 4.56 × 10−5
(4.87 × 10−5)
INF 0.0375
(0.0733)
W × INF 0.0235
(0.1145)
EDU 0.0028*
(0.0017)
W × EDU 0.0036
(0.0031)
Rho 0.2479**
(0.07624)
LR H0 : θ ¼ 0ð Þ 16.24*** LR H0 : θþ ρβ ¼ 0ð Þ 34.87***
Hausman test 68.93*** R squared 0.7621
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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negative impact on local IC until it reaches 0.74. For
the indirect effect, the turning point is at approxi-
mately 0.83, which shows that SER has a positive
influence on the IC concerning other units after
reaching 0.83. The indirect impact is not only at
the neighbouring unit but also on the non-neigh-
bouring unit because of the spatial interaction
between neighbouring units and non-neighbouring
units. For the total effect, the turning point is
approximately 0.80. The total effect shows the aggre-
gated impact of the SER of a local unit on the global
scale. Therefore, after the SER of one unit arrives at
0.80, it can generate a positive influence as a whole,
namely it has a positive impact on China.
For the other variables, pollution intensity (PI), the
increment of GDP per capita (d(GDP_PC)), the incre-
ment of industry scale (d(SI)) and the percentage of
people with higher education (EDU) also impact the
local IC. PI also influences other units. Globally, PI, d
(SI) and EDU on the whole influence IC. Although the
influence of d(SI) and EDU on other units is not sig-
nificant, they generate indelible impacts on the local IC
and globally produce significant impacts. Moreover,
competitiveness in neighbouring units also has a positive
impact on local IC.
The signs of all of the other significant variables
conform to theory. Pollution intensity has negative
influences on three levels because higher pollution
would impel people and even capital to flee. The
increment of the scale of industry is positive because
a scale effect can be activated by the augment of the
scale. GDP per capita is also positive because it
indicates that the economic level of a province, and
the development of economy and industry are
always mutually promoted. EDU has good effects
on IC, both locally and globally because higher edu-
cation can transform human resources into human
capital. More people receiving higher education can
increase human capital and then raise labour pro-
ductivity. As for the competitiveness of neighbour-
ing units, the positive sign means positive
agglomeration, which is consistent with Moran’s I
test.
X. Discussion
The above analysis suggests that IC and SER have a
U-shaped relationship. The turning point is 0.74 for
local, 0.83 for other provinces and 0.80 for the whole
country. It is obvious that SER firstly has a negative
impact on the industry and then a positive impact,
which means that the traditional hypothesis fits the
first part and then Porter’s Hypothesis kicks in.
What is the mechanism behind the U-shaped rela-
tionship? The U-shaped relationship means that
when environmental regulations are lax, there is a
trade-off; when they are stringent, there is a positive
impact. The explanation follows.
Assuming all else is equal, when regulations are
lax, most firms in society cannot obtain an innova-
tion offset due to reasons mentioned by Porter.
Thus, the trade-off system functions. This trade-off
will continue until the stringency reaches a turning
point and innovation is triggered because the pro-
duction possible frontier does not move outward,
and more factors are used to address environmental
regulations during that period. Because of a fear of a
continuous decrease in competitiveness, the govern-
ment would likely stop enforcing the more stringent
regulations. It is a vicious circle.
When regulations are stringent to some extent,
they will trigger innovation for some firms, provided
that other conditions are successfully being met. The
whole process is similar to the procedure shown in
Figure 1. When environmental regulations are
strengthened to some extent, firms are gradually
divided into two categories. Those firms that can
move their bounded-rational frontier outward and
trigger innovation offset will enjoy increased IC,
while those that cannot will be eliminated because
Table 5. Direct effect, indirect effect and total effect of expla-
natory variables.
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect
SER −0.2434**
(0.0812)
−0.5512**
(0.2303)
−0.7946**
(0.2521)
SER2 0.1640**
(0.0687)
0.3318*
(0.1800)
0.4959**
(0.1897)
PI −0.1535***
(0.0468)
−0.3036***
(0.0811)
−0.4570***
(0.0968)
d(SI) 5.32 × 10−6**
(2.26 × 10−6)
5.5 × 10−6
(3.35 × 10−6)
1.08 × 10−5**
(4.14 × 10−6)
MS 4.1 × 10−8
(5.45 × 10−7)
4.1 × 10−7
(7.35 × 10−7)
9.99 × 10−7
(9.42 × 10−7)
d(GDP_PC) 0.0980***
(0.0292)
−0.0020
(0.0592)
0.0959
(0.0655)
d(POP) 3.87 × 10−5
(3.77 × 10−5)
−1.31 × 10−4
(8.4810−5)
9.2 × 10−5
(9.27 × 10−5)
d(FDI) 2.01 × 10−5
(3.42 × 10−5)
7.31 × 10−5
(5.81 × 10−5)
9.32 × 10−5
(7.41 × 10−5)
INF 0.0343
(0.0655)
0.0490
(0.1219)
0.0833
(0.1269)
EDU 0.0030*
(0.0016)
0.0056
(0.0037)
0.0086**
(0.0038)
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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they fall behind the competition and cannot keep
pace with the times. It takes some time to trigger
innovation and eliminate the laggard firms, so there
could be trade-off at first. But after that, the surviv-
ing firms will improve the IC of the whole society.
Meanwhile, many new firms that conform to the
time trend will join the competition, which can
also improve competitiveness. Thus, positive impacts
occur.
In consideration of the above two points, the
U-shaped relationship is generated when the SER
ranges from a low level to a high level.
XI. Conclusions
Currently, more attention is paid to the association
between environmental regulations and IC due to
increasing pressures on economic development and
environmental protection. As for China, little
research has been conducted on this topic, although
the country plays a significant role in the world’s
economic development and environmental protec-
tion. Therefore, this study aims to build an appro-
priate framework to explain the impact of
environmental regulations on IC and to explore the
mechanisms behind the association based on data
for China. Our conclusions are as follows.
There is a U-shaped relationship between envir-
onmental regulations and IC, and not a simple linear
relationship. Such an association means that there is
a turning point before which environmental regula-
tions will not have a positive impact on IC. This
conclusion also demonstrates that the traditional
hypothesis fits the situation first when regulations
are lax; later, after the turning point, Porter’s
Hypothesis works.
Within this framework, the traditional hypothesis
and Porter’s Hypothesis do not contradict each other
because the former is based on the rational-eco-
nomic man assumption, while the latter is based on
the bounded rationality assumption. The traditional
hypothesis stresses that the response path to more
stringent regulations moves along with the produc-
tion possibility frontier, while Porter’s Hypothesis
states that the response path moves from the point
within the frontier curve to the point approaching
the frontier curve. Innovation can move the frontier
curve outward. If innovation offset is triggered suc-
cessfully, Porter’s Hypothesis works, and then, a
U-shaped relationship can exist. Then, in the long
run, environmental regulations have positive
impacts on IC. If innovation offset fails to be trig-
gered, a trade-off association between environmental
regulation and IC works and continues.
Stringent regulations can force firms to pay atten-
tion to more fundamental solutions rather than end-
of-pipe or secondary treatment solutions (Porter and
Van De Linde 1995), which is demonstrated by the
econometric model, where stringent environmental
regulations could have positive impacts, while lax
regulations would have a negative influence.
The idea that a well-designed policy and better
education can trigger innovation originated from
bounded rationality. A well-designed policy can
reduce the cost of information collection and pro-
vide useful information. Education can also improve
one’s cognitive and processing ability. Both can
improve people’s rationality level and further trigger
innovation.
Although China is in a good position to generate
positive impacts of environmental regulations on IC
as a whole, its development is still unbalanced. Most
provinces in middle, west and northeast China still
do not enjoy a positive association between the two
variables. Thus, there is much room for improve-
ment. The government can do something to turn the
situation around in the following ways.
Currently, the main regulation instruments are
still the command-and-control. Although such
instruments are effective in reducing pollutant emis-
sions, they sometimes do not reflect market demand
and are economically inefficient due to government
Firms
Stringent
Environmental
Regulation 
Triggers
Innovation
Offset?
No Yes
Eliminated Survived
Industrial
Competitiveness
Increased
New Firms
Figure 1. Influences of stringent environmental regulations.
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failure. Therefore, this kind of policy often drains the
production factor, which can distort the output
arrangement between firms and the government
and make the optimal combination impossible.
This study recommends that the Chinese govern-
ment adopts market-based instruments. These
instruments signal market demand and market
trends, thus reducing the possibility of government
failure and providing more useful and correct infor-
mation for rational decision-making. Market-based
instruments are better designed than command-and-
control instruments because of their ability to self-
adjust according to market signals and require less
human intervention.
Porter and Van De Linde (1995) stressed that
stringent regulations can focus greater company
attention on fundamental solutions, rather than
end-of-pipe or secondary treatment solutions.
Therefore, stringent regulations can trigger innova-
tion better and faster.
In this study, the U-shaped relationship between
environmental regulations and competitiveness has
been demonstrated. Only stringent regulations that
pass the turning point can generate a positive effect
on IC. Although there may be a trade-off at first, the
government should not be too concerned. The long-
term impact is positive as long as the regulations are
well designed. Thus, the government should set its
sights to implementing stringent environmental
regulations.
To close, two limitations will be discussed that
can lead to future research opportunities. First, due
to data unavailability, different industries in the sec-
ondary sector had to be aggregated to the provincial
level. This restriction needs to be overcome, consid-
ering that impacts on competitiveness are likely to
be sector specific. Hence, an industry-specific study
needs to be conducted in future. Second, another
limitation of our study is that it treats Chinese pro-
vinces as unrelated systems, hereby not accommo-
dating the possibility that policy might lead to
emission leakage, for instance that the output of
energy-intensive industries could relocate from pro-
vinces with emission commitments to provinces
without.
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Appendix
Specification of Spatial Weight Matrix
The spatial weight matrixW is the key of spatial analysis because
it expresses the spatial association between units. How to set an
appropriate spatial weight matrix is controversial and difficult
(Bavaud, 1998). Usually, W is set by dichotomy based on the
Rook criterion of contiguity. The rule defines wij ¼ 1 for regions
that share a common side with the region of interest; wij ¼ 0 for
non-neighbouring regions and elements of the principal diago-
nal. The general form of matrixW is as follows:
W ¼
w11 w12 . . .
w21 w22 . . .
..
. ..
. . .
.
wN1 wN2 . . .
w1N
w2N
..
.
wNN
2
6664
3
7775 (7)
Table A1 shows information about the neighbouring pro-
vinces of each province, except for Tibet, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Macao. It is worth noting that Hainan province
is an island located to the south of Guangdong Province. It
was once a part of Guangdong in the history. Therefore, the
research set Guangdong as the neighbouring province of
Hainan.
Such a spatial weight matrix based on the Rook criterion is
reasonable in this research. For regional characteristics vari-
ables, neighbouring provinces often has more association with
each other than non-neighbouring provinces in economy and
culture. As for environmental regulations, the weight is also
rational. Here is the deduction. Assume that industrial compe-
titiveness ICit is a function of pollutants (Pit) and other char-
acteristic variables (Zit), the competitiveness is as follows:
Table A1. Description of indicators.
Category Variable Sub-variable Indicator Units
Y Industrial competitiveness (IC) Labour Labour productivity
(output per employment)
10k yuan per capita
Growth of employment %
Capital Capital productivity
(output per capital)
Growth of fixed asset %
Innovation Ratio of new products to revenue from principal business %
Numbers of patent per unit of firms
Ability ratio of profits to cost %
Product sale rate %
X Stringency of environmental regulation (SER) Treatment rate of waste water %
Treatment rate of SO2 %
Treatment rate of solid waste %
Pollution intensity (PI) Emission of waste water per unit of output ton/10k yuan
Emission of SO2 per unit of output ton/10k yuan
Emission of solid waste per unit of output ton/10k yuan
Scale of industry (SI) Output of industry 10k yuan
Market structure (MS) Numbers of firms within the industry
Population (POP) Population of the province 10k
Economic development situation (GDP_PC) GDP per capita of the province 10k yuan per capita
Infrastructure (INF) Density of road network km/km2
Density of railway km/km2
Density of post road km/km2
Education level (EDU) Proportion of residents with higher education %
Foreign capital (FDI) Foreign direct investment 100m yuan
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ICit ¼ f Pit;Zitð Þ (8)
Then, assume pollutants can spill over to other provinces
through wind and water flow, biologic chain etc. and can
only have significant impacts on neighbouring provinces
because of the distance limitation. Another important
assumption is that emission of pollutants is decided by the
degree of stringency of environmental regulations (SERit).
Therefore, the amount of pollutants in a province is as
follows:
Pit ¼ g SERit;
X
ji
SERit
 !
(9)
where SERit represents pollutants produced by the local
province;
P
ji
SERit represents pollutants from neighbouring
provinces which indicates the spillover effect of pollutants.
Combining formula 6 with formula 7, the SER in the local
provinces together with the SER in the neighbouring pro-
vinces can have an influence on the local industrial competi-
tiveness as follows:
ICit ¼ h SERit;
X
ji
SERit;Zit
 !
(10)
Therefore, the spatial weight matrix based on the Rook
criterion is also reasonable to interpret the functions of
neighbouring environmental regulations.
Before using the spatial weight matrix W, W should be
normalized in the row, namely every matrix element wij is
divided by the sum of elements of each row element, which
uses formula 9. The purpose of normalization is to make the
sum of spatial effects of neighbouring units on each unit
equal to 1 and to eliminate the external influence of the
inter-region. After that, W is set.
wij ¼
wijPN
j¼1 wij
(11)
WE ¼
w11 w

12 . . .
w21 w

22 . . .
..
. ..
. . .
.
wN1 w

N2 . . .
w1N
w2N
..
.
wNN
2
6664
3
7775 (12)
Test for spatial association
Before modelling, the spatial association should be tested to
decide whether to adopt the spatial model or not. Moran
(1950) proposes Moran’s I test to detect the global spatial
association. The null hypothesis is that a spatial association
does not exist. The formula is as follows:
I ¼ nPn
i
Pn
j wij

Pn
i
Pn
j wij yi  yð Þ yj  y
 
Pn
i yi  yð Þ2
(13)
where wij is the spatial weighted matrix, yij and y are the
variable in the ith location and the mean of the variable and
n is the number of observations.
The statistic value of Moran’s I ranges from −1 to 1. If the
value is significantly larger than 0, the spatial units that have
similar attributes agglomerate. If it is significantly smaller
than 0, the spatial units are negatively related which means
that units with different attributes are clustered. If the value
equals 0 approximately, spatial effects do not exist.
Moreover, the Z test will be used to test the significance of
Moran’s I. The formula is as follows:
Z ¼ I  E Ið Þﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Var Ið Þp (14)
where E(I) is the expect value of Moran I, Var(I) is the
variance of Moran I and their calculation is based on the
random distribution assumption. Under the null hypothesis,
the Z statistic follows asymptotic normal distribution.
The table below shows the Moran’s I test of IC and SER
from 2001 to 2010.
As is shown in Table A2, it is apparent that the
Moran’s I of IC and SER are all positive and significant
at least on 5% level from 2001 to 2010, which means that
Table A2. Neighbouring information of each provinces.
Code Name of provinces Neighbouring provinces Code Name of provinces Neighbouring provinces
1 Beijing 2, 3 16 Henan 3, 4, 12, 15, 17, 26
2 Tianjin 1, 3, 15 17 Hubei 12, 14, 16, 18, 22, 26
3 Hebei 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 15, 16 18 Hunan 14, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24
4 Shanxi 3, 5, 16, 26 19 Guangdong 13, 14, 18, 20, 21
5 Inner Mongolia 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 26, 27, 29 20 Guangxi 18, 19, 24, 25
6 Liaoning 3, 5, 7 21 Hainan 19
7 Jilin 5, 6, 8 22 Chongqing 17, 18, 23, 24, 26
8 Heilongjiang 5, 7 23 Sichuan 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28
9 Shanghai 10, 11 24 Guizhou 18, 20, 22, 23, 25
10 Jiangsu 9, 11, 12, 15 25 Yunnan 20, 23, 24,
11 Zhejiang 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 26 Shaanxi 4, 5, 16, 17, 22, 23, 27, 29
12 Anhui 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17 27 Gansu 5, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30
13 Fujian 11, 14, 19 28 Qinghai 23, 27, 30
14 Jiangxi 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19 29 Ningxia 5, 26, 27
15 Shandong 2, 3, 10, 12, 16 30 Xinjiang 27, 28
(Source: Map of People’s Republic of China issued by SinoMaps Press in 2013)
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spatial units agglomerate positively in terms of environ-
mental regulations and industrial competitiveness in China
and the distribution is not random. The spatial association
cannot be ignored.
Model specification: Since the spatial association has
been detected, the spatial model is the better choice. For
spatial dependence, Anselin (1988) summarizes two rea-
sons to explain the situation. The first is the by-product of
measurement errors for observation in neighbouring spa-
tial units. In practice, data are obtained at an aggregate
level. So, there may be no correspondence between the
spatial scope of the phenomenon under the research and
the delineation of the spatial units of observations.
Therefore, measurement error is likely to exist. And, it
tends to spill over across the boundaries, which means
that measurement errors for observation i are likely to be
related to neighbouring spatial units. The second reason is
spatial interaction and diffuse process leading to the
dependence between phenomena at different locations
that means observation at one unit is determined partially
by what happens elsewhere in the system. Therefore, the
econometric models presented above are appropriate for
the analyses (see formulas 4–6).
Table A3. Moran’s I of IC and SER (2001–2010).
Year
IC SER
Moran’s I p-Value Moran’s I p-Value
2001 0.2362 0.014* 0.3768 0.003**
2002 0.3674 0.015* 0.4492 0.002**
2003 0.3530 0.001** 0.3595 0.002**
2004 0.2393 0.017* 0.4470 0.002**
2005 0.2633 0.014* 0.3651 0.004**
2006 0.2650 0.015* 0.4244 0.001**
2007 0.2728 0.011* 0.4584 0.001**
2008 0.3329 0.004** 0.4562 0.001**
2009 0.3051 0.006** 0.4514 0.002**
2010 0.3215 0.003** 0.4638 0.001**
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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